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This paper describes the performance of (or damage to) ceilings in buildings during the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch earthquake and the subsequent aftershocks. In buildings that suffered severe structural damage, ceilings and other non-structural components (rather expectedly) failed, but even in buildings with little damage to their structural systems, ceilings were found to be severely damaged. The extent of ceiling damage, where the ceilings were subject to severe shaking, depended on the type of the ceiling system, the size and weight of the ceilings and the interaction of ceilings with other elements. The varieties and extent of observed ceiling damage are discussed in this paper with the help of photographs taken after the earthquake.
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The magnitude 6.3 earthquake that struck Christchurch on the 22nd February 2011 caused widespread damage to the multi-storey buildings within Christchurch’s central business district (CBD). Damage to the facades of these buildings was a clear contributor to the overall building damage. This paper presents the damage assessment of the facade systems from a survey of 217 multi-storey buildings in the Christchurch CBD. The survey covers only buildings greater than three stories in height, excluding the majority of unreinforced masonry facades, of which damage has been well documented. Since a building can have more than one type of facade system, a total of 371 facade systems are surveyed. Observation of facade damage is discussed and is presented in terms of its performance level. Trends in facade performance are examined in relation the structural parameters such as construction age and height.
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A reconnaissance survey of earth walled buildings in the Christchurch area was carried out following the February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake. Twenty six earth buildings were inspected during the survey including historic earth buildings and recent reinforced earth buildings. Some of these buildings had previously been inspected following the September 2010 Darfield Earthquake.
The February 2011 Earthquake caused comparable patterns of damage to earth buildings as the September 2010 Darfield earthquake except for unreinforced pressed brick buildings which performed particularly badly. Reinforced earth buildings constructed since the 1990’s performed well during the February 2011 earthquake provided the overall wall bracing was adequate and detailing of the reinforcement and connections were generally in accordance with the NZ Earth Building Standards. Some older unreinforced rammed earth buildings constructed between 1950 and 1980, all of which had reinforced concrete foundations and bond beams, performed relatively well with only minor cracking. Unreinforced cob and adobe buildings in the area of strong shaking suffered significant damage and will require reconstruction or repair of the walls and strengthening of the upper floor or ceiling diaphragms. The performance of six houses are discussed as case studies that cover the range of buildings observed.
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The earthquake on 22 February 2011 was very close to Christchurch city, generating very high level ground excitations that caused severe geotechnical effects and widespread structural damage. This paper outlines the wide range of damage to houses resulting from liquefaction, lateral spreading, rockfall, and horizontal and vertical ground accelerations. The response of typical forms of house construction and structural components are discussed, with many different types of damage described. The majority of houses in the Christchurch region are one or two storey light timber frame buildings. This type of construction has performed extremely well for life safety, but thousands of houses have some degree of structural or non-structural damage. The New Zealand Building Code needs to be reviewed in several areas, especially the requirements for foundations and reinforced concrete floors.
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This paper describes pounding damage sustained by buildings and bridges in the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Approximately 6% of buildings in Christchurch CBD were observed to have suffered some form of serious pounding damage. Almost all of this pounding damage occurred in masonry buildings, further highlighting their vulnerability to this phenomenon. Modern buildings were found to be vulnerable to pounding damage where overly stiff and strong ‘flashing’ components were installed in existing building separations. Soil variability is identified as a key aspect that amplifies the relative movement of buildings, and hence increases the likelihood of pounding damage. Pounding damage in bridges was found to be relatively minor and infrequent in the Christchurch earthquake.
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On 22 February 2011 the Mw6.2 Christchurch earthquake occurred with an epicentre less than 10 km from the Christchurch Central Business District (CBD) on an unknown buried fault at the edge of the city. The majority of damage was a result of lateral spreading along the Avon and Heathcote Rivers, with few bridges damaged due to ground shaking only. The most significant damage was to bridges along the Avon River, coinciding with the areas of the most severe liquefaction, with less severe liquefaction damage developing along the Heathcote River. Most affected were bridge approaches, abutments and piers, with a range of damage levels identified across the bridge stock. In the days following the earthquake, teams from various organizations performed inspections on over 800 bridges throughout the affected Canterbury region. This paper details the preliminary findings based on visual inspections and some preliminary analyses of highway and road bridges. The paper comprises information supplied by consulting engineering firms which were also directly involved in the inspections soon after the earthquake.
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This paper presents preliminary field observations on the performance of selected steel structures in Christchurch during the earthquake series of 2010 to 2011. This comprises 6 damaging earthquakes, on 4 September and 26 December 2010, February 22, June 6 and two on June 13, 2011. Most notable of these was the 4 September event, at Ms7.1 and MM7 (MM as observed in the Christchurch CBD) and most intense was the 22 February event at Ms6.3 and MM9-10 within the CBD. Focus is on performance of concentrically braced frames, eccentrically braced frames, moment resisting frames and industrial storage racks. With a few notable exceptions, steel structures performed well during this earthquake series, to the extent that inelastic deformations were less than what would have been expected given the severity of the recorded strong motions. Some hypotheses are formulated to explain this satisfactory performance.
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As part of the ‘Project Masonry’ Recovery Project funded by the New Zealand Natural Hazards Research Platform, commencing in March 2011, an international team of researchers was deployed to document and interpret the observed earthquake damage to masonry buildings and to churches as a result of the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. The study focused on investigating commonly encountered failure patterns and collapse mechanisms. A brief summary of activities undertaken is presented, detailing the observations that were made on the performance of and the deficiencies that contributed to the damage to approximately 650 inspected unreinforced clay brick masonry (URM) buildings, to 90 unreinforced stone masonry buildings, to 342 reinforced concrete masonry (RCM) buildings, to 112 churches in the Canterbury region, and to just under 1100 residential dwellings having external masonry veneer cladding. In addition, details are provided of retrofit techniques that were implemented within relevant Christchurch URM buildings prior to the 22nd February earthquake and brief suggestions are provided regarding appropriate seismic retrofit and remediation techniques for stone masonry buildings.
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Six months after the 4 September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake, a Mw 6.2 Christchurch (Lyttelton) aftershock struck Christchurch on the 22 February 2011. This earthquake was centred approximately 10km south-east of the Christchurch CBD at a shallow depth of 5km, resulting in intense seismic shaking within the Christchurch central business district (CBD). Unlike the 4 Sept earthquake when limited-to-moderate damage was observed in engineered reinforced concrete (RC) buildings [35], in the 22 February event a high number of RC Buildings in the Christchurch CBD (16.2 % out of 833) were severely damaged. There were 182 fatalities, 135 of which were the unfortunate consequences of the complete collapse of two mid-rise RC buildings.
This paper describes immediate observations of damage to RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Some preliminary lessons are highlighted and discussed in light of the observed performance of the RC building stock. Damage statistics and typical damage patterns are presented for various configurations and lateral resisting systems. Data was collated predominantly from first-hand post-earthquake reconnaissance observations by the authors, complemented with detailed assessment of the structural drawings of critical buildings and the observed behaviour.
Overall, the 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch earthquake was a particularly severe test for both modern seismically-designed and existing non-ductile RC buildings. The sequence of earthquakes since the 4 Sept 2010, particularly the 22 Feb event has confirmed old lessons and brought to life new critical ones, highlighting some urgent action required to remedy structural deficiencies in both existing and “modern” buildings. Given the major social and economic impact of the earthquakes to a country with strong seismic engineering tradition, no doubt some aspects of the seismic design will be improved based on the lessons from Christchurch. The bar needs to and can be raised, starting with a strong endorsement of new damage-resisting, whilst cost-efficient, technologies as well as the strict enforcement, including financial incentives, of active policies for the seismic retrofit of existing buildings at a national scale.
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At 12.51 pm (NZST) on 22 February 2011 a shallow, magnitude MW 6.2 earthquake with an epicentre located just south of Christchurch, New Zealand, caused widespread devastation including building collapse, liquefaction and landslides. Throughout the Port Hills of Banks Peninsula on the southern fringes of Christchurch landslide and ground damage caused by the earthquake included rock-fall (both cliff collapse and boulder roll), incipient loess landslides, and retaining wall and fill failures. Four deaths from rock-fall occurred during the mainshock and one during an aftershock later in the afternoon of the 22nd. Hundreds of houses were damaged by rock-falls and landslide-induced ground cracking.
Four distinct landslide or ground failure types have been recognised. Firstly, rocks fell from lava outcrops on the Port Hills and rolled and bounced over hundreds of metres damaging houses located on lower slopes and on valley floors. Secondly, over-steepened present-day and former sea-cliffs collapsed catastrophically. Houses were damaged by tension cracks on the slopes above the cliff faces and by debris inundation at the toe of the slopes. Thirdly, incipient movement of landslides in loess, ranging from a few millimetres up to 0.35 metres, occurred at several locations. Again houses were damaged by extension fissuring at the head of these features and compressional movement at the toe. The fourth mode of failure observed was retaining wall and fill failures, including shaking-induced settlement and fill displacement. These failures commonly affected both houses and roads.
In the days and weeks immediately following the earthquake a major concern was how to manage the risks from another large aftershock or a long return period rainstorm, in the areas worst affected by landslides, should one occur. Each of the four identified landslide types required a different risk management strategy. The rock-fall and boulder roll hazard was managed by identifying buildings at risk and enforcing mandatory evacuation. In the days immediately following the earthquake this process was based on expert opinion. In the weeks after the earthquake this process was rapidly enhanced with empirical data to confirm the risk. The rock-falls associated with cliff collapse were managed by evacuating properties damaged by extensional ground cracking at the top of the cliffs, adjacent properties, and properties damaged by debris inundation at the toe of the cliffs. The incipient landslide hazard was managed by rapidly deploying movement monitoring technologies to determine if these features were still moving and to monitor their response to on-going aftershock activity. The fill and retaining wall failures were managed by encouraging public reporting of areas of concern for rapid assessment by a geotechnical professional.
The success of the landslide risk management strategy was demonstrated by the magnitude MW 6.0 earthquake of 13 June when rock-falls and boulder roll damaged evacuated buildings and ground cracking and debris inundation further damaged evacuated areas. Some incipient landslides reactivated, producing similar movement patterns to the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Several retaining walls identified as dangerous and cordoned off also collapsed. No lives were lost and no serious injuries were reported from landslides in the 13 June 2011 earthquake.
